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Abstract
The aim of this article is to give a compact and self-contained description of the class of para-
consistent extensions of Johansson’s (or minimal) logic (denoted Lj). The class of all non-trivial
Lj-extensions is divided into three classes: the class Int of intermediate logics, the class Neg of neg-
ative logics (with axiom ¬p), and the class Par of proper paraconsistent Lj-extensions. For elements
of Par, we define their intuitionistic and negative counterparts from classes Int and Par, respectively,
and study to which extend paraconsistent logics are determined by their counterparts. To this end we
need special presentation of j -algebras, which is also given in the article. In conclusion, we study
Kripke semantics for paraconsistent Lj-extensions.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this article is to describe the structure of the class of paraconsistent ex-
tensions of Johansson’s (or minimal) logic (denoted Lj). Some results of the article were
included in my reports at the earlier paraconsistent meetings (see [6–8]), but the material
was divided into parts and mixed with other topics. Here I will present all this material in
a systematic form adding also the new results about interrelations between the intervals of
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44 S.P. Odintsov / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 43–65the form Spec(I,N) (Section 4), about the cardinality of intervals of this form (Section 6),
and about the Kripke semantics for paraconsistent Lj-extensions (see Section 7).
Of course, the title of the article, which combines terms “paraconsistent” and “Jo-
hansson’s logic”, needs some explanations. The definition of paraconsistent logics as
logics admitting inconsistent non-trivial theories is usually accompanied with the commen-
tary that not all logics satisfying this definition are “really” paraconsistent, for example,
Johansson’s logic, because in Lj any negated formula is inferable from contradiction.
However, there are several reasons that justify this combination of terms and this topic
of investigations. First, Johansson’s logic is worthy of interest as paraconsistent analogue
of intuitionistic logic. Second, the study of lattices of logics, for example, intermediate or
modal logics, plays a very important role in the development of non-classical logics. And
third, the paraconsistent point of view, namely, paying attention to inconsistent theories
and non-equivalent contradictions, takes a central place in our investigation.
2. Preliminary remarks
The negation in minimal logic Lj as well as in any of its extensions can be defined as
reduction to a propositional constant ⊥, “absurdity”. Therefore, we choose a propositional
language {∧,∨,→,⊥} as basic and consider a negation as an abbreviation, ¬ϕ := ϕ → ⊥.
We will use also the abbreviation ϕ ↔ ψ := (ϕ → ψ)∧ (ψ → ϕ). As usual, by a logic we
mean a set of formulas closed under substitution and modus ponens. For a logic L and a
set of formulas X, L+X denotes the least logic containing L and all formulas of X. With
any logic L, we associate in a standard way an inference relation L. For a set of formulas
X and a formula ϕ, the relation X L ϕ means that ϕ can be obtained from elements of X
and tautologies of L in a finite number of steps by using the rule of modus ponens.
A logic L is said to be explosive if the associated consequence relation possesses the
property that {ϕ,¬ϕ} L ψ for any ϕ and ψ . A paraconsistent logic is non-explosive.
The minimal or Johansson logic Lj can be defined in the chosen language via only
positive axioms leaving the constant ⊥ undefined:
(1) p → (q → p),
(2) (p → (q → r)) → ((p → q) → (p → r)),
(3) (p ∧ q) → p,
(4) (p ∧ q) → q ,
(5) (p → q) → ((p → r) → (p → (q ∧ r))),
(6) p → (p ∨ q),
(7) q → (p ∨ q),
(8) (p → r) → ((q → r) → ((p ∨ q) → r)).
The same axioms will define in the positive language {∧,∨,→} the well known positive
logic Lp. We denote Jhn+(Jhn) the class of all (non-trivial) extensions of Johansson’s
logic. The join operation in the lattice of logics Jhn+ we denote ∨, the meet operation,
which coincides with the set-theoretical intersection, we denote as usual ∩.
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denotation, we follow [11].
• Li = Lj + {⊥ → p} is intuitionistic logic.
• Ln = Lj + {⊥} is minimal negative logic.
• Le = Lj + {p ∨ (p → q)} is Curry’s logic of classical refutability.
• Lk = Li + {p ∨ (p → q)} is classical logic.
• Lmn = Ln + {p ∨ (p → q)} is maximal negative logic.
• F is trivial logic, i.e., the set of all formulas.
Despite the fact that we postulate nothing about the constant ⊥, the negation defined
trough ⊥ shares many important properties of intuitionistic and classical negations.
Proposition 1. The following formulas are provable in Lj:
(1) ¬¬(p ∨ ¬p),
(2) (p → ¬q) → (q → ¬p),
(3) (p → q) → (¬q → ¬p),
(4) (¬p ∨ ¬q) → ¬(p ∧ q),
(5) ¬(p ∨ q) ↔ (¬p ∧ ¬q),
(6) p → ¬¬p,
(7) ¬¬¬p ↔ ¬p,
(8) ¬(p ∧ ¬p),
(9) (p ∨ q) → ¬(¬p ∧ ¬q),
(10) (p ∧ q) → ¬(¬p ∨ ¬q),
(11) (p → q) → ¬(p ∧ ¬q).
Below we give a few definitions and facts concerning the algebraic semantics of propo-
sitional logics. The detailed information can be found in [10,11].
Let A be an algebra of the language {∨,∧,→,⊥,1} with an additional constant 1 for
the only distinguished element. A map v : {p0,p1, . . .} → A from the set of propositional
variables to the universe of A is called an A-valuation. Each A-valuation extends naturally
to the set of all formulas. A formula ϕ is true on A, or is an identity of A, and we write
A |= ϕ, if the equality v(ϕ) = 1 holds for any A-valuation v.
Obviously, the set LA = {ϕ | A |= ϕ} of formulas is a logic, which we call a logic of A.
A logic of a class of algebras K is the intersection of logics of algebras in K,
LK =
⋂
{LA | A ∈ K}.
The algebra A is a model for a logic L if L ⊆ LA. If also L = LA, we say that A is
a characteristic model for L. Every logic in Jhn has a characteristic model [11, Ch. III,
Sec. 3].
By a j -algebra we mean an algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,→,⊥,1〉 such that its reduct
〈A,∧,∨,→,1〉 is an implicative lattice and the constant ⊥ is interpreted as an arbi-
trary element of the universe A. We recall that 〈A,∧,∨,→,1〉 is an implicative lattice
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plement operation, i.e., a → b is the greatest element in the set {c | a ∧ c b}.
A Heyting algebra is a j -algebra with the least element ⊥. A negative algebra is a
j -algebra with the greatest element ⊥, i.e., ⊥ = 1.
A Peirce algebra is an implicative lattice satisfying the identity p ∨ (p → q), or,
equivalently, ((p → q) → p) → p. A Peirce–Johansson algebra or, shortly, pj -algebra
(negative Peirce algebra, Boolean algebra) is a j -algebra (respectively, negative algebra,
Heyting algebra) satisfying the identity p ∨ (p → q).
For any j -algebra A and Heyting algebra B such that they have disjoined universes we
will denote by A ⊕ B a j -algebra obtained by identifying the greatest element of A and the
least element of B. Of course, the contradiction of A will play the role of ⊥ in the resulting
algebra A ⊕ B. We denote by 2 a two-element Boolean algebra and by 2′ a two-element
negative algebra.
All classes of algebras defined above form varieties, which define the following logics.
• Lj is the logic of the variety of j -algebras.
• Li is the logic of the variety of Heyting algebras.
• Ln is the logic of the variety of negative j -algebras.
• Le is the logic of the variety of pj -algebras.
• Lk is the logic of the variety of Boolean algebras.
• Lmn is the logic of the variety of negative Peirce algebras.
An element  of a j -algebra A is said to be the second greatest element if for every
x ∈ A, x = 1 if and only if x  . The second greatest element of a j -algebra A will be
denoted by A, or simply by .
A j -algebra A is said to be strongly compact if there is the second greatest element in A.
It is well known that every strongly compact Boolean algebra is isomorphic to 2. Sim-
ilarly, every strongly compact negative Peirce algebra is isomorphic to 2′. In this way,
Lk = L2 and Lmn = L2′. Every j -algebra have a subalgebra isomorphic to 2 or 2′. There-
fore, Lj has exactly two maximal non-trivial extensions.
Proposition 2 [11]. Every L ∈ Jhn is contained either in Lk or in Lmn.
It was proved by McKay [4] that strongly compact Heyting algebras are exactly sub-
directly irreducible Heyting algebras. This result can be generalized in a trivial manner to
j -algebras.
Proposition 3. A j -algebra is subdirectly irreducible if and only if it is strongly compact.
It is well known that a variety of algebras is generated by its finitely generated subdi-
rectly irreducible algebras. Together with previous proposition this yields
Proposition 4. Let L ∈ Jhn and ϕ be a formula. We have ϕ ∈ L if and only if A |= ϕ for
every finitely generated strongly compact j -algebra A modeling L.
S.P. Odintsov / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 43–65 47Let us recall Miura’s result on the axiomatizability of intersections of logics.
Proposition 5. Let L0 = Lj + {ϕi | i ∈ I } and L1 = Lj + {ψj | j ∈ J } be finitely axiom-
atizable extensions of the minimal logic. Then the intersection L0 ∩ L1 is also finitely
axiomatizable,
L0 ∩L1 = Lj +
{
ϕi ∨ψ1j | i ∈ I, j ∈ J
}
,
where ψ1j is obtained from ψj by substitution of propositional variables in such a way that
ϕi and ψ1j have no propositional variables in common.
Similar result is well known for extensions of the intuitionistic logic [5]. However, it is
not hard to verify that it remains valid for extensions of Johansson’s logic.
Corollary 6. Le = Lk ∩ Lmn.
Indeed, by definition Lk = Le + {⊥ → p} and Lmn = Le + {⊥}. Therefore, Lk ∩
Lmn = Le + {⊥ ∨ (⊥ → p)} = Le since ⊥ ∨ (⊥ → p) is a substitutional instance of
p ∨ (p → q) ∈ Le.
In conclusion of this section, we prove that the lattice Jhn+ is distributive. Recall that
an arithmetic variety is a variety, which is congruence permutable and congruence distrib-
utive. According to Pixley’s theorem (see [1]) the variety V is arithmetic if and only if there
exists a term m(x,y, z) such that the identities
m(x,y, x) = m(x,y, y) = m(y,y, x) = x
hold in V. In case of j -algebras, as well as in case of Heyting algebras (see [1]), we can
use the term
m(x,y, z) := ((x → y) → z)∧ ((z → y) → x)∧ (x ∨ z)
to establish that the varieties of j -algebras and Heyting algebras are arithmetic. The verifi-
cation is straightforward.
Let us consider ω-generated free j -algebra Aω and Con(Aω), its congruence lattice. The
lattice Con(Aω) is distributive. Moreover, congruences of Con(Aω) are permutable with
respect to the composition. Elements of Aω can be identified with classes of equivalence of
formulas with respect to Lj,
|Aω| =
{[ϕ] | ϕ ∈ F}.
With any L ∈ Jhn+ we associate the congruence
θL :=
{
([ϕ0], [ϕ1]) | ϕ0 ↔ ϕ1 ∈ L
}
.
Clearly, the mapping L → θL is one-to-one and preserves the ordering. Consequently, to
prove that it is a lattice embedding it is enough to check that for any L0,L1 ∈ Jhn+, the
congruences θL0 ∧ θL1 and θL0 ∨ θL1 also have the form θL for suitable L. Observe that θL
is closed under substitution, i.e., if [ϕ0]θL[ϕ1], then [ϕ0(ψ1, . . . ,ψn)]θL[ϕ1((ψ1, . . . ,ψn))]
for any ψ1, . . . ,ψn. It can be easily seen that if θ ∈ Con(Aω) is closed under substitution,
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θ = θLθ .
In this way, it is enough to check that θL0 ∧ θL1 and θL0 ∨ θL1 are closed under sub-
stitution. We consider only the non-trivial case of θL0 ∨ θL1 . Since Aω is congruence
permutable, θL0 ∨ θL1 = θL0 ◦ θL1 . So, [ϕ0]θL0 ∨ θL1[ϕ1] if and only if there is a for-
mula ψ such that [ϕ0]θL0 [ψ] and [ψ]θL1[ϕ1]. This immediately implies that θL0 ∨ θL1 is
closed under substitution. We have thus proved
Proposition 7. The lattice Jhn+ is distributive.
3. Decomposition of Jhn into three intervals
A natural first step in studying the class of extensions of a logic L is to find its max-
imal extensions and to classify the logics from this class with respect to their maximal
extensions. As was noted in the previous section, the logic Lj has two maximal non-trivial
extensions, the classical logic Lk = L2 and the maximal negative logic Lmn = L2′. So
the class Jhn is divided into three subclasses. The first subclass consists of all logics ad-
mitting only one maximal extension Lk, we denote it by Int. The second consists of logics
contained in Lmn, but not in Lk. We denote this subclass Neg. Finally, the third subclass
includes all logics admitting both extensions and we denote this class Par. It turns out that
each of these subclasses forms an interval in the lattice Jhn+.
Proposition 8.
(1) Int = [Li,Lk].
(2) Neg = [Ln,Lmn].
(3) Par = [Lj,Le].
Proof. (1) If some logic L is not contained in Lmn, then any model of L is a Heyting al-
gebra. Indeed, assume that A |= L and there is a ∈ A strictly less than ⊥. Then the quotient
algebra A/〈⊥〉, where 〈⊥〉 denotes the principal filter generated by the element ⊥, is non-
trivial. Take b ∈ A/〈⊥〉 such that b = ⊥. Then A/〈⊥〉 has a subalgebra with the universe
{⊥, b}, which is isomorphic to 2′. In this way, L ⊆ Lmn, a contradiction. Thus, ⊥ is the
least element in all models of L and the formula ⊥ → p belongs to L, i.e., Li ⊆ L.
(2) Assume L is not contained in Lk and prove that all models of L are negative. If
A |= L and 1 = ⊥, then A has a subalgebra with the universe {1,⊥}, which is isomorphic
to 2, i.e., L ⊆ Lk, a contradiction. Thus, ⊥ = 1 in all models of L and Ln = Lj+{⊥} ⊆ L.
(3) If L has two maximal extensions, then it is contained in Lk ∩ Lmn, which is equal
to Le by Corollary 6. 
Note that all logics of Int are explosive and all logics of Neg have a degenerate negation
in the sense that any negated formula is provable in them. Moreover, these classes are well
studied; logics of Neg are definitionally equivalent to positive logics. So the class Par
contains all interesting cases of paraconsistent negations in the class Jhn. We start the
investigation of this class by defining for its logics counterparts in classes Int and Neg.
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We define two mappings (−)int : Jhn+ → Int and (−)neg : Jhn+ → Neg as follows. For
any L ∈ Jhn+, put Lint := L+ {⊥ → p} = L∨ Li and Lneg := L+ {⊥} = L∨ Ln.
Proposition 9.
(1) The mappings (−)int and (−)neg are lattice epimorphisms.
(2) For any L ∈ Jhn+, Lint = F if and only if L ∈ Neg.
(3) For any L ∈ Jhn+, Lneg = F if and only if L ∈ Int.
Proof. (1) This fact easily follows from the distributivity of Jhn+.
(2) If L ∈ Neg, then ⊥, ⊥ → p ∈ Lint, which leads to explosion. If L belongs to Par ∪
Int, then L, as well as Li is contained in Lk, consequently Lint is also contained in Lk.
(3) If L ∈ Int, then ⊥, ⊥ → p ∈ Lneg, which leads to explosion. If L is in Par ∪ Neg,
then L, as well as Ln is contained in Lmn, consequently Lneg is also contained in
Lmn. 
The following statement gives an alternative definition of counterparts. Let In(ϕ(p1,
. . . , pn)) := ϕ(p1 ∨⊥, . . . , pn ∨⊥) for any formula ϕ with propositional variables among
p1, . . . , pn.
Proposition 10. Let L ∈ Par. Then
Lint =
{
ϕ | In(ϕ) ∈ L} and Lneg = {ϕ | ⊥ → ϕ ∈ L}.
Proof. Let L∗ := {ϕ | In(ϕ) ∈ L}. We check first that L∗ is a logic.
Lemma 11. For any ϕ, Lj  (In(ϕ)∨ ⊥) ↔ In(ϕ).
Proof. We establish by a trivial induction on the structure of formulas that Lj  ⊥ → In(ϕ)
for any ϕ. The desired conclusion can be easily deduced from this fact. 
If ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ L∗, then the formula ϕ(p1 ∨ ⊥, . . . , pn ∨ ⊥) and its substitutional
instance ϕ(In(ψ1)∨⊥, . . . , In(ψn)∨⊥) are in L. By Lemma 11 we have (In(ψi)∨⊥) ↔
In(ψi) ∈ Lj, i = 1, . . . , n, which yields ϕ(In(ψ1), . . . , In(ψn)) = In(ϕ(ψ1, . . . ,ψn)) ∈ L,
i.e., ϕ(ψ1, . . . ,ψn) ∈ L∗.
If ϕ, ϕ → ψ ∈ L∗, then In(ϕ), In(ϕ → ψ) = In(ϕ) → In(ψ) ∈ L, whence I (ψ) ∈ L
and ψ ∈ L∗. Thus, L∗ is closed under substitution and modus ponens.
The fact that In(ϕ) was defined as a substitutional instance of ϕ implies L ⊆ L∗. At
the same time, In(⊥ → p) = ⊥ → (p ∨ ⊥) ∈ Lj ⊆ L. Thus, Lint ⊆ L∗. To check the
inverse inclusion, take a ϕ = ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ L∗. Then In(ϕ) ∈ L ⊆ Lint. Equivalences
pi ↔ (pi ∨ ⊥) hold in Lint, which allows one to conclude Lint  In(ϕ) ↔ ϕ, whence
ϕ ∈ Lint.
The first equality is thus proved, the second one immediately follows from the deduction
theorem. 
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of formulas as follows: C(∅) := {⊥} and C(X) := {C(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ X} for non-empty X. This
operator defines a strong translation of the negative counterpart into a paraconsistent logic.
More exactly, the following holds.
Proposition 12. Let L ∈ Par, X be a set of formulas, and ϕ a formula. Then X Lneg ϕ if
and only if C(X) L C(ϕ).
Proof. Since Lneg = L+{⊥}, the relation X Lneg ϕ holds if and only if X ∪ {⊥} L ϕ or,
equivalently, X ∪ {⊥} L ϕ ∧ ⊥. Taking into account that (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ≡ (ϕ ∧ ⊥) ∈ Lj one
can easily obtain that the last consequence relation is equivalent to C(X) L C(ϕ). 
This statement shows that the counterpart Lneg explicate the non-trivial structure of
contradictions of the paraconsistent logic L. The formulas of Lneg behave itself exactly so
as constructed from them contradictions in L.
We have thus defined for any logic from Par its counterparts in the classes Int and Neg
and shown that these counterparts can be translated into the original logic. Turn now to the
inverse problem. Given logics I ∈ Int and N ∈ Neg, which logics from Par have I and N
as intuitionistic and negative counterparts, respectively? In other words, let us consider the
families of logics
Spec(I,N) := {L ∈ Par | Lint = I,Lneg = N}
for I ∈ Int and N ∈ Neg. All families of this form are non-empty and form intervals in the
lattice Jhn+.
Proposition 13. Let I ∈ Int and N ∈ Neg. Then
Spec(I,N) = [I ∗N,I ∩N ],
where I ∗N = Lj + {In(ϕ),⊥ → ψ | ϕ ∈ I,ψ ∈ N}.
Proof. In view of Proposition 9, if L1 ⊆ L2, then (L1)int ⊆ (L2)int and (L1)neg ⊆ (L2)neg.
This fact implies that the set Spec(I,N) is convex with respect to the lattice order of Jhn+.
By definition, L ⊆ Lint,Lneg for any L. Therefore, for any L ∈ Spec(I,N), we have
L ⊆ I ∩N . On the other hand, if L ∈ Spec(I,N), then{
In(ϕ),⊥ → ψ | ϕ ∈ I, ψ ∈ N}⊆ L,
i.e., I ∗N ⊆ L.
It remains to check that the logics I ∩ N and I ∗ N are in Spec(I,N). Clearly, {In(ϕ) |
ϕ ∈ I } ⊆ I and {⊥ → ψ | ψ ∈ N} ⊆ N . At the same time, any formula ⊥ → ψ belongs
to I since I ∈ Int, and any formula In(ϕ) belongs to the negative logic N , which can be
stated by a trivial induction on the structure of formulas. In this way, I ∗N ⊆ I ∩N , which
implies by Proposition 9 (I ∗N)int ⊆ (I ∩N)int and (I ∗N)neg ⊆ (I ∩N)neg.
By definition of I ∗N , we have
I ⊆ (I ∗N)int and N ⊆ (I ∗N)neg.
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(I ∩N)int ⊆ Iint = I and (I ∩N)neg ⊆ Nneg = N.
Combining all these facts we obtain I ∗N,I ∩N ∈ Spec(I,N). 
It is interesting that the upper points of intervals of the form Spec(I,N) also form an
interval in the lattice Jhn+. We put Le′ := Lj + {⊥ ∨ (⊥ → p)}.
Proposition 14. The mapping (I,N) → I ∩ N defines a lattice isomorphism of the direct
product Int×Neg onto the interval [Le′,Le]. The inverse isomorphism is given by the rule
L → (Lint,Lneg).
Proof. If L = I ∩N for some I ∈ Int and N ∈ Neg, then
I = Lint = L+ {⊥ → p} and N = Lneg = L+ {⊥}
as it was established in the proof of the previous proposition. Taking into account Propo-
sition 5 we obtain L = L + {⊥ ∨ (⊥ → p)}, i.e., Le′ ⊆ L. It is clear that L ∈ Par as an
intersection of intermediate and negative logics, therefore, L ⊆ Le by Proposition 8.
Conversely, let L ∈ [Le′,Le]. We have then
Lint ∩Lneg =
(
L+ {⊥ → p})∩ (L+ {⊥})= L+ {⊥ ∨ (⊥ → p)}= L,
which means that L can be represented as an intersection of intermediate and negative
logics. We have thus proved that (I,N) → I ∩N is a mapping of Int×Neg onto [Le′,Le].
The equations (I ∩N)int = I and (I ∩N)neg = N imply that this mapping is one-to-one.
The fact that this mapping is homomorphic follows immediately from the definition. 
5. Three dimensions of Par
We can see now that the class Par has a three-dimensional structure. The position of
a logic L in this class is determined by its intuitionistic counterpart Lint, which can be
considered as a logic modeling the reasoning in L under the additional assumption of
inconsistency, or of impossibility of contradictions, and by its structure of contradictions
explicated in the negative counterpart Lneg. When inconsistent patterns of reasoning and
the structure of contradictions are fixed, we have the further variety of possibilities for
combining them presented by the interval of logics Spec(Lint,Lneg). The place of L in this
interval can be considered as its third coordinate in Par, the sense of which is not quite
clear yet. It becomes clearer in the next section. Now we turn to the fact that unlike the
first and second coordinates having absolute scales, Int and Neg, respectively, the size of
the scale for the third coordinate is dependent of the first two coordinates. However, one
can find natural interrelations between these scales, i.e., between the intervals of the form
Spec(I,N) for different I ∈ Int and N ∈ Neg.
Consider two pairs of logics P1 = (I1,N1) and P2 = (I2,N2), where I1, I2 ∈ Int,
N1,N2 ∈ Neg. The relation P1  P2 means that I1 ⊆ I2 and N1 ⊆ N2. We will write also
Spec(P1) for Spec(I1,N1).
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Par and eP1,P2 : Spec(P1) → Par are defined as follows
rP2,P1(L) := L∩ (I1 ∩N1), eP1,P2(L) := L∨ (I2 ∗N2).
Proposition 15. Let the pairs of logics P1,P2 be such that P1  P2. The following facts
hold.
(1) For any L ∈ Spec(P2), we have eP1,P2rP2,P1(L) = L.
(2) For any L ∈ Spec(P1), we have
rP2,P1eP1,P2(L) = L∨ rP2,P1(I2 ∗N2).
(3) eP1,P2 is a lattice epimorphism from Spec(P1) onto Spec(P2).
(4) rP2,P1 is a lattice monomorphism from Spec(P2) into Spec(P1) and has the following
image
rP2,P1(P2) =
[
rP2,P1(I2 ∗N2), I1 ∩N1
]
.
(5) For any P3 such that P2  P3, we have
eP1,P2eP2,P3 = eP1,P3 , rP3,P2rP2,P1 = rP3,P1 .
Proof. (1) We calculate
eP1,P2rP2,P1(L) =
(
L∩ (I1 ∩N1)
)∨ (I2 ∗N2)
= (L∨ (I2 ∗N2))∩ ((I1 ∩N1)∨ (I2 ∗N2)).
By Proposition 13, I2 ∗N2 is the least point of Spec(P2), therefore, we have L∨(I2 ∗N2) =
L. Further, we need one lemma.
Lemma 16. For any L ∈ Spec(I,N), I ∩N = L∨ Le′.
Proof. (Le′)int equals to Li, the least logic in Int, and (Le′)neg = Ln, which is the least
logic in Neg. Now, it follows from Proposition 9 that L∨ Le′ has the same counterparts as
L. By Proposition 14, L∨ Le′ coincides with the greatest point of Spec(I,N). 
Using this lemma and the obvious relation I1 ∗N1 ⊆ I2 ∗N2 we obtain
(I1 ∩N1)∨ (I2 ∗N2) =
(
(I1 ∗N1)∨ Le′
)∨ (I2 ∗N2) = I2 ∗N2 ∨ Le′ = I2 ∩N2.
And finally, eP1,P2rP2,P1(L) = L∩ (I2 ∩N2) = L.
(2) The direct computation shows
rP2,P1eP1,P2(L) =
(
L∨ (I2 ∗N2)
)∩ (I1 ∩N1)
= (L∩ (I1 ∩N1))∨ ((I2 ∗N2)∩ (I1 ∩N1))= L∨ rP2,P1(I2 ∗N2).
(3) It follows from the definition and the distributivity of Jhn+ that eP1,P2 is a lattice
homomorphism. Let L ∈ Spec(P1) and L′ := eP1,P2(L) = L∨ (I2 ∗N2). By Proposition 9,
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L′ ∈ Spec(P2). The fact that eP1,P2 is an epimorphism will follow from item (1).
(4) As above, we use Proposition 9 to check that rP2,P1 maps Spec(P2) into Spec(P1).
This is a homomorphism due to the distributivity of Jhn+. Applying the formula of item (1)
to rP2,P1(L1) = rP2,P1(L2) we obtain L1 = L2. Thus, rP2,P1 is a monomorphism. The fact
that rP2,P1 preserves the ordering of Jhn implies the inclusion rP2,P1(P2) ⊆ [rP2,P1(I2 ∗
N2), I1 ∩ N1]. To check the inverse inclusion take a logic L ∈ Spec(P1) with the property
rP2,P1(I2 ∗N2) ⊆ L. Then by item (2)
rP2,P1eP1,P2(L) = L∨ rP2,P1(I2 ∗N2) = L,
i.e., L ∈ rP2,P1(P2).
(5) This item follows from the obvious relations I2 ∗ N2 ⊆ I3 ∗ N3 and I1 ∩ N1 ⊆
I2 ∩N2. 
The above proposition shows, in particular, that any interval Spec(I,N) is isomorphic
to an upper subinterval of Spec(Li,Ln). In this way, this latter interval can be considered
as a scale for the third dimension of the class Par. Extending the intuitionistic and negative
counterparts, we restrict simultaneously the part of the scale, which can be used to construct
a logic with the given counterparts. It is worth noticing also the following consequence of
the last proposition.
Corollary 17. Let P1 = (I1,N1) and P2 = (I2,N2) be pairs of logics such that P1  P2.
For any logics L1,L2 ∈ Spec(P2), L1 = L2, there is a formula ϕ ∈ I1 ∩ N1 such that
ϕ ∈ L1 L2, where  denotes a symmetrical difference of sets.
Proof. Let L1,L2 ∈ Spec(P2). If L1 = L2, but these logics are not distinguished by a
formula ϕ ∈ I1 ∩N1, then rP2,P1(L1) = rP2,P1(L2). By item (2) of the previous proposition,
rP2,P1 is a monomorphism, whence, L1 = L2, a contradiction. 
In particular, any two logics from an interval Spec(I,N) can be distinguished via a
formula from Le′ = Li ∩ Ln. Moreover, any logic from the interval Spec(I,N) can be
axiomatized by formulas from Le′ modulo the least logic of the interval I ∗N . Indeed, for
any L ∈ Spec(I,N) we have by Proposition 15(3) L = (L∩ Le′)∨ (I ∗N).
For further investigations of the structure of the class Par, we need semantical consid-
erations.
6. Representation of j -algebras
Let A be a j -algebra. We put
A⊥ := {a ∈ A | a ⊥} and A⊥ := {a ∈ A | a ⊥}.
The set A⊥ is obviously closed under the operations of A and ⊥ is the least element of A⊥.
In this way, we can define a Heyting algebra A⊥ as a subalgebra of A with the universe A⊥.
The set A⊥ is a sublattice of A, but it is not a subalgebra of A, except for the case ⊥ = 1.
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x →⊥ y := (x → y)∧ ⊥
turns A⊥ into a j -algebra, which we denote A⊥. Obviously, A⊥ is a negative algebra. We
call A⊥ and A⊥ upper and lower algebras of A, respectively. The notions of upper and
lower algebras are semantical analogues of intuitionistic and negative counterparts.
Proposition 18. Let A be a j -algebra and ϕ a formula. The following equivalences take
place:
A⊥ |= ϕ ⇔ A |= In(ϕ), A⊥ |= ϕ ⇔ A |= ⊥ → ϕ.
Proof. Check the first equivalence. Assume A⊥ |= ϕ and prove A |= In(ϕ). For an A-
valuation v define an A⊥-valuation v′ by the rule v′(p) := v(p) ∨ ⊥. It follows easily
that v(In(ϕ)) = v′(ϕ), which immediately implies the desired conclusion.
Conversely, let A |= In(ϕ). For any A⊥-valuation v, we have v = v′, in particular,
v(In(ϕ)) = v(ϕ), which completes the proof of the equivalence.
To prove the second equivalence we need the following
Lemma 19. For any j -algebra A, the mapping τ : A → A⊥, τ(x) = x ∧ ⊥, is an epimor-
phism of j -algebras.
The proof immediately follows from the definition of implication in A⊥ and the identity
(x → y)∧ z = ((x ∧ z) → (y ∧ z)) ∧ z satisfied in all j -algebras.
Assuming A⊥ |= ϕ we take an A-valuation v and consider the composition τv, which
is an A⊥-valuation. In view of the fact that τ is an epimorphism, v(ϕ ∧ ⊥) = τv(ϕ). But
τv(ϕ) = ⊥ by assumption, which yields the equalities v(⊥ → (ϕ ∧⊥)) = v(⊥ → ϕ) = 1.
Thus, A |= ⊥ → ϕ.
Now, we let A |= ⊥ → ϕ. Let v be an A⊥-valuation and v′ be an A-valuation such
that v(p) = v′(p) for all p. Clearly, v = τv′. By assumption we have ⊥  v′(ϕ ∧ ⊥) =
τv′(ϕ) = v(ϕ), ⊥ is the greatest element of A⊥, whence, v(ϕ) = ⊥. In this way, A⊥ |=
ϕ. 
It follows from this fact that for a j -algebra A modeling L, its upper and lower algebras
model intuitionistic and negative counterparts of L, respectively.
Corollary 20. Let A be a j -algebra, L ∈ Par, I ∈ Int, and N ∈ Neg. The following facts
are true.
(1) If A |= L, then A⊥ |= Lint and A⊥ |= Lneg.
(2) A |= I ∗N if and only if A⊥ |= I and A⊥ |= N .
Proof. (1) This is a direct consequence of the previous proposition and the definition of
counterparts.
S.P. Odintsov / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 43–65 55(2) If A |= I ∗ N , then A⊥ |= I and A⊥ |= N by item (1). If A⊥ |= I and A⊥ |= N , then
by Proposition 18, A |= {In(ϕ),⊥ → ψ : ϕ ∈ I, ψ ∈ N}. The latter means exactly that
A |= I ∗N . 
For a class K of j -algebras, let
K⊥ := {A⊥ | A ∈ K}, K⊥ := {A⊥ | A ∈ K}.
The following proposition is a generalization of Corollary 20(1) to classes of algebras.
Proposition 21. Let K be a class of j -algebras. Then
(LK)int = LK⊥, and (LK)neg = LK⊥.
Proof. A formula ϕ belongs to (LK)int if and only if In(ϕ) ∈ LK. Due to Proposition 18
the latter means that for any A ∈ K, A⊥ |= ϕ, i.e., ϕ ∈ LK⊥. The second equality can be
proved similarly. 
It is interesting that the second statement of Corollary 20 cannot be generalized in a
similar way to classes of algebras. If a class K1 of Heyting algebras defines a logic I ∈ Int
and a class K2 of negative algebras defines a logic N ∈ Neg, then the class of all algebras
with the upper algebra in K1 and the lower algebra in K2, i.e., the class
K1 ∗ K2 := {A | A⊥ ∈ K1, A⊥ ∈ K2},
does not determine, in general case, the logic I ∗ N . For example, Lk = L2, Lmn = L2′,
but
L{2} ∗ {2′} = L3 = Lk ∗ Lmn,
where 3 is a three-element chain with ⊥ interpreted as an intermediate element (see Propo-
sition 30 below).
The above remarks give rise to a question about the structure of an arbitrary j -algebra
with given upper and lower algebras. First, we give a construction of j -algebras, which
have given Heyting and negative algebras as their upper and lower algebras respectively.
Let B be a Heyting algebra, C a negative algebra, and f :C → B a lower semilattice ho-
momorphism preserving the unit element. Let
B ×f C :=
{
(b, c) | b ∈ B,c ∈ C,b f (c)}.
Proposition 22. The set B ×f C is closed under the componentwise lattice operations ∨
and ∧ and under the implication → defined as follows
(b1, c1) → (b2, c2) :=
(
(b1 →B b2) ∧ f (c1 →C c2), c1 →C c2
)
.
The algebraic system B×f C := 〈B ×f C,∨,∧,→,⊥,1〉, where ⊥ := (⊥B,⊥C) and 1 :=
(1B,⊥C), is a j -algebra. Moreover, (B ×f C)⊥ ∼= B and (B ×f C)⊥ ∼= C.
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c1, c2 ∈ C, b1  f (c1), and b2  f (c2). The element (b1, c1) → (b2, c2), if it is defined,
must be greatest among the elements (x, y) such that x  f (y) and (b1, c1) ∧ (x, y) 
(b2, c2). The latter is equivalent to relations x  (b1 → b2) ∧ f (y) and y  c1 → c2.
Taking into account that f preserves the ordering we immediately obtain that the desired
pseudocomplement is equal to ((b1 → b2) ∧ f (c1 → c2), c1 → c2). Thus, B ×f C is a
j -algebra. Its upper and lower algebras have the form
∣∣(B ×f C)⊥∣∣= {(b,⊥) | b ∈ B} and ∣∣(B ×f C)⊥∣∣= {(⊥, c) | c ∈ C}.
It is clear that the mappings (b,⊥) → b, b ∈ B , and (⊥, c) → c, c ∈ C, determine isomor-
phisms of (B ×f C)⊥ and B and of (B ×f C)⊥ and C, respectively. 
Every j -algebra can be presented in the above form.
Proposition 23. For any j -algebra A, the mapping fA : A⊥ → A⊥ given by the rule
fA(x) := ⊥ ∨ (⊥ → x) is a lower semilattice homomorphism preserving the unit element,
and the mapping λ(x) := (x ∨ ⊥, x ∧ ⊥) defines an isomorphism
A ∼= A⊥ ×fA A⊥.
Proof. We verify that fA is a semilattice homomorphism preserving the unit element. For
brevity, we omit the lower index in the denotation fA. We have f (⊥) = ⊥∨ (⊥ → ⊥) = 1.
Further,
f (y1)∧ f (y2) =
(⊥ ∨ (⊥ → y1))∧ (⊥ ∨ (⊥ → y2))
= ⊥ ∨ ((⊥ → y1)∧ (⊥ → y2))= ⊥ ∨ (⊥ → (y1 ∧ y2))
= f (y1 ∧ y2).
Thus, the j -algebra B := A⊥ ×fA A⊥ is well defined.
Let us check that λ maps A onto B. In Lj, one can easily prove the formula (p ∨ ⊥) →
(⊥ ∨ (⊥ → (p ∧ ⊥))). This means that for any a ∈ A, the inequality a ∨ ⊥⊥ ∨ (⊥ →
(a ∧ ⊥)) holds, i.e., λ(a) ∈ B. Now, let a, b ∈ A, a  ⊥, b  ⊥, and a  ⊥ ∨ (⊥ →
b). We show that there exists an element c ∈ A such that a = c ∨ ⊥ and b = c ∧ ⊥. Put
c = a ∧ (⊥ → b), then c ∨ ⊥ = (⊥ ∨ a) ∧ (⊥ ∨ (⊥ → b)) = a ∧ (⊥ ∨ (⊥ → b)) = a
and also c ∧ ⊥ = a ∧ (⊥ → b) ∧ ⊥ = ⊥ ∧ (⊥ → b) = b. Thus, the mapping λ : A → B
is onto. It is the well-known fact from the lattice theory that the mapping of the form
x → (x ∨⊥, x ∧⊥) defines a lattice embedding of A into the direct product A⊥ × A⊥. We
have thus proved that λ is a lattice isomorphism of A and A⊥ ×fA A⊥ and it remains to
check that λ preserves the pseudocomplement operation.
Let a, b ∈ A. We have a ∧ (a → b) b. The lattice isomorphism properties of λ imply
λ(a)∧ λ(a → b) λ(b), therefore, λ(a → b) λ(a) → λ(b).
Due to the fact that λ is onto we have λ(a) → λ(b) = λ(c) for some c ∈ A. The relation
λ(a) ∧ λ(c)  λ(b) implies again a ∧ c  b, i.e., c  a → b, and finally, λ(c) = λ(a) →
λ(b) λ(a → b). 
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Proof. If A |= I ∩N , then by Corollary 20 A⊥ |= I = (I ∩N)int and A⊥ |= N = (I ∩N)neg.
Moreover, in this case, A |= ⊥ ∨ (⊥ → p) (see Proposition 14), whence fA(x) = 1 for
any x ∈ A. The latter fact means that the pseudocomplement operation of A⊥ ×fA A⊥ is
componentwise and that a  f (b) for any a ∈ A⊥ and b ∈ A⊥. In this way, A⊥ ×fA A⊥
coincides with the direct product of A⊥ × A⊥.
The inverse implication is obvious. 
The presentation of j -algebras described above allows to understand the difference be-
tween various logics in the class Spec(I,N). Any model A of a logic L ∈ Spec(I,N) is
constructed from models of its counterparts, A⊥ and A⊥, and any element of A has two
components, say, positive and negative, element of A⊥ and element of A⊥. As we can see
from Proposition 22, the second component may impose restrictions on the admissible val-
ues of the first component. The nature of such restrictions characterizes the place of a logic
in the interval Spec(I,N). For all models of the upper point of the interval, I ∩N , any com-
bination of positive and negative components is admissible. In models of the least logic,
I ∗ N , conversely, all possible restrictions, which the negative component may impose on
the positive one, are admissible.
7. Cardinality of intervals Spec(I,N)
First, we improve the results of the previous section about the structure of intervals of
the form Spec(I,N).
For any logic L ∈ Int(Neg), we denote by (L)↑ the class of its extensions in Int (re-
spectively, in Neg), i.e., (L)↑ = [L,Lk] (respectively, (L)↑ = [L,Lmn]).
Proposition 25. For any I ∈ Int and N ∈ Neg, the mapping (L1,L2) → (L1 ∗ L2) ∩ (I ∩
N) defines an isomorphic embedding of the direct product (I )↑ × (N)↑ into the interval
Spec(I,N).
Proof. Let Modsi(L) denote the set of strongly compact models of a logic L. It is clear
that L1 ∩ L2 = L(Modsi(L1) ∪ Modsi(L2)) for any two logics L1,L2 ∈ Jhn. The vari-
ety of j -algebras is congruence distributive, therefore, by the well-known Jónsson’s result
Modsi (L1 ∩ L2) is contained in the class HSUp(Modsi (L1) ∪ Modsi (L2)), where H(K)
denotes the class of homomorphic images of algebras from the class K, S(K) denotes the
class of subalgebras, and Up(K) the class of ultraproducts.
Let us consider an ultraproduct B :=∏i∈I Ai/F , where each of the algebras Ai belongs
Modsi (L1)∪ Modsi(L2). Since F is an ultrafilter, one of the sets{
i | Ai ∈ Modsi(L1)
}
or
{
i | Ai ∈ Modsi (L2)
}
belongs to F . Consequently, either B |= L1, or B |= L2. The class of models of a
logic is obviously closed under homomorphic images and subalgebras, whence, any
58 S.P. Odintsov / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 43–65A ∈ Modsi (L1 ∩L2) is a model of L1 or of L2. We have thus proved that Modsi (L1 ∩L2) =
Modsi (L1)∪ Modsi(L2).
Take logics I1, I2 ∈ (I )↑ and N1,N2 ∈ (N)↑ such that (I1,N1) = (I2,N2). If I1 = I2
and, for definiteness, I1  I2, let A be a strongly compact model of I2 such that A |= I1 and
let B be an arbitrary model of N1. In case when I1 = I2, N1 = N2, and say N1  N2, we
let A to be an arbitrary strongly compact model of I1, and B a model of N2, but not of N1.
Consider the j -algebra B ⊕ A. The second greatest element of A will be also the second
greatest element of B ⊕ A, whence B ⊕ A is strongly compact. By Corollary 20, B ⊕ A ∈
Modsi (I2 ∗N2) \ Modsi(I1 ∗N1).
Further, Modsi(I ∩N) = Modsi (I )∪Modsi(N) as it was proved above, i.e., any element
of Modsi(I ∩N) is either Heyting or negative algebra. In this way, B ⊕ A /∈ Modsi (I ∩N).
Due to relations Modsi ((Ii ∗ Ni) ∩ (I ∩ N)) = Modsi(Ii ∗ Ni) ∪ Modsi(I ∩ N), i = 1,2,
we conclude that B ⊕ A is a model of (I2 ∗ N2) ∩ (I ∩ N) and not of (Ii ∗ Ni) ∩ (I ∩ N).
We have thus proved that the mapping (L1,L2) → (L1 ∗L2)∩ (I ∩N) is one-to-one. That
this is a homomorphism follows immediately from the definition. Finally, the fact that the
image (L1 ∗L2)∩ (I ∩N) belongs to Spec(I,N) for (L1,L2) ∈ (I )↑× (N)↑ follows from
Proposition 9. 
Corollary 26. For any I ∈ Int and N ∈ Neg,∣∣Spec(I,Ln)∣∣= ∣∣Spec(Li,N)∣∣= 2ω.
The proof follows immediately from the previous proposition and the well-known fact
that |(Ln)↑| = |(Li)↑| = 2ω.
The last proposition does not yet give a complete impression of how rich intervals
Spec(I,N) are. Even when logics I and N have only finitely many extensions, the interval
Spec(I,N) is infinite.
To prove further results we will apply the technique of Jankov’s formulas suggested by
Jankov [2,3] and modified by Ono [9] and Wron´ski [14,15]. We recall some basic elements
of Jankov’s method adopting it for j -algebras. For further details the reader may consult
the works cited above.
Let A = 〈A,∨,∧,→,⊥,1〉 be a not more than countable and strongly compact j -
algebra. For each element a ∈ A, a = ⊥, we attach a unique propositional variable pa .
Further, for any a ∈ A, we attach a unique atomic formula Za as follows
Za :=
{
pa, if a = ⊥,
⊥, if a = ⊥.
A diagram (A) of A is the following set of formulas
(A) := {Za∨b → (Za ∨Zb), (Za ∨Zb) → Za∨b | a, b ∈ A}
∪ {Za∧b → (Za ∧Zb), (Za ∧Zb) → Za∧b | a, b ∈ A}
∪ {Za→b → (Za → Zb), (Za → Zb) → Za→b | a, b ∈ A}.
Let A be a finite j -algebra. Then (A) is a finite set of formulas and we can define the
Jankov formula of A by
J (A) :=
(∧
(A)
)
→ ZA ,
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(A)) is the conjunction of all formulas in (A). It is easy to see that J (A) /∈ LA.
Moreover, the following statement holds.
Lemma 27. Let A be a finite and strongly compact j -algebra. For each j -algebra B, the
following two conditions are equivalent:
(1) J (A) /∈ LB,
(2) A is embeddable into a quotient algebra of B.
For the proof, see e.g. [14].
A sequence {Li}i<ω of logics from Jhn is said to be strongly independent if Li ∨
i =j Lj for each i < ω.
The following two facts are natural generalizations of Proposition 1.2 and Lemma 1.4
of [13] to the class of extensions of minimal logic.
Proposition 28. Let {Li}i<ω be a strongly independent sequence of logics from Jhn. For
every subsets I and J of ω, I = J if and only if ∨i∈I Li =∨i∈J Li .
Proposition 29. Suppose {Ai}i<ω is a sequence of strongly compact j -algebras satisfying
the following conditions:
(1) each Ai is finite,
(2) for every i, j < ω, i = j implies that Ai cannot be embedded into any quotient algebra
of Aj .
If a logic L is contained in every LAi (i < ω), the sequence {Li}i<ω of logics defined by
Li = L+ {J (Ai )} (i < ω) is strongly independent.
Now we are ready to turn to the study of cardinalities of intervals Spec(I,N).
Proposition 30. The interval Spec(Lk,Lmn) has the following structure:
Lk ∗ Lmn ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ln ⊆ · · · ⊆ L1 ⊆ L0,
where L0 = Le = Lk ∩ Lmn; Ln = L(Bn ⊕ 2) = Lk ∗ Lmn + {J (Bn+1 ⊕ 2)} for n > 0,
where Bn is a negative Peirce algebra with n atoms (see Fig. 1); finally, Lk ∗ Lmn =
L(B ⊕ 2), where B is an arbitrary infinite negative Peirce algebra.
Proof. All logics from the interval Spec(Lk,Lmn) have the same negative models,
namely, the models of Lmn. Therefore, every logic L ∈ Spec(Lk,Lmn) is determined
by the class of its non-negative finitely generated strongly compact models, and we denote
this class by Mod+fgsc(L). Let A ∈ Mod+fgsc(L). Then A⊥ is non-trivial and strongly compact,
moreover, A⊥ |= Lk. Any strongly compact Boolean algebra is two-element, therefore, A
have the form B⊕2, where B is a finitely generated model of Lmn, i.e., a finitely generated
negative Peirce algebra. It is clear that B ⊕ 2 is finitely generated if and only if B is finitely
generated.
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The only difference between Boolean and negative Peirce algebras is in the interpreta-
tion of ⊥. In Boolean algebras, ⊥ is interpreted as the least element, whereas in negative
Peirce algebras, it is interpreted as the greatest element of an algebra. In this way, all finitely
generated negative Peirce algebras are finite. And we have a countable chain of different
(up to isomorphism) finitely generated negative Peirce algebras {Bn | n ∈ ω}, where Bn is
a negative Peirce algebra with n-atoms, i.e., with n minimal elements in the set Bn \ {f }
for f denoting the least element of Bn. Clearly, Bn is isomorphically embedded into Bm
or is isomorphic to a homomorphic image of Bm if and only if nm. Therefore, the class
Mod+fgsc(L) for L ∈ Spec(Lk,Lmn) may have only the form
Mα = {Bn ⊕ 2 | n < α},
where 1  α  ω. It is not hard to check that each of these sets can be realized as a set
of non-negative finitely generated strongly compact models of a suitable logic Lα from
the interval Spec(Lk,Lmn). Indeed, the class M1 = {B0 ⊕ 2} = {2} corresponds to the
logic Le = Lk ∩ Lmn, which has the unique non-negative strongly compact model, 2. For
1 < α < ω, we consider a logic
Lα := Lk ∗ Lmn +
{
J (Bα ⊕ 2)
}
.
According to Lemma 27 the class Mod+fgsc(Lα) coincides with the class of algebras of the
form Bn ⊕ 2 which are not embeddable into quotient algebras of Bα ⊕ 2. Every proper
quotient algebra of Bα ⊕ 2 is negative and non-negative algebra cannot be embedded into
it. The algebra Bn ⊕ 2 is embeddable into Bm ⊕ 2 if and only if Bn is embeddable into Bm.
Combining all these facts we obtain
Mod+fgsc(Lα) = Mα.
From the last equality, we have Lα = L(Bα ⊕ 2).
The class Spec(Lk,Lmn) has the least element Lω = Lk ∗ Lmn and, obviously,
Mod+fgsc(Lk ∗ Lmn) = Mω. If we take an arbitrary infinite negative Peirce algebra B, any
algebra of the form Bn ⊕ 2 will be embeddable into B ⊕ 2. Therefore, Lω = L(B ⊕ 2).
Classes of models Mα , 1  α  ω, form an ascending chain of type ω + 1 with re-
spect to inclusion, which means that the corresponding logics Lα,1 α  ω, will form a
descending chain of type (ω + 1)∗. 
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of Proposition 29) on finite models of negative counterpart N , which guaranties that for
any intuitionistic counterpart the interval Spec(I,N) will have the power of the continuum.
Proposition 31. Let I ∈ Int, N ∈ Neg, and let there exist a family
{Bi | i < ω}
of finite negative algebras such that Bi |= N for all i < ω, and Bi is not embeddable into
Bj for i = j . Then∣∣Spec(I,N)∣∣= 2ω.
Proof. In view of Proposition 15 it is enough to consider the case I = Lk. Consider the
sequence {Ai}i<ω of j -algebras defined by Ai = Bi ⊕ 2, i < ω. It will be a sequence of
strongly compact j -algebras modeling Lk ∗ N . By assumption if i = j , Bi is not embed-
dable into Bj , in which case also Ai is not embeddable into Aj . Further, note that every
proper quotient algebra of Aj will be negative. This means that the non-negative algebra
Ai cannot be embedded into a quotient algebra of Aj .
Define a sequence of logics {Li}i<ω by Li = Lk ∗ N + {J (Ai )}. By Proposition 29
this sequence is strongly independent, and we obtain a continuum of different logics of
the form
∨
i∈I Li , I ⊆ ω. It can be easily proved that each of these logics belongs to the
interval Spec(Lk,N). Indeed, on one hand, Ai is not a model for Li and Aj , j = i, models
Li , therefore, Li is nontrivial and nonnegative. This means that (Lk∗N)int ⊆ (Li)int = Lk.
On the other hand, the second greatest element of Ai is ⊥ and the formula J (Ai ) has the
form ¬ϕ, from which we infer
(Li)neg = Lk ∗N + {⊥,¬ϕ} = Lk ∗N + {⊥} = (Lk ∗N)neg = N. 
8. Kripke semantics
In conclusion, we will say a few words about analogues of upper and lower algebras
in Kripke frames. The detailed explanation of Kripke semantics for extensions of minimal
logic can be found in [12].
We call Kripke j -frame, or simply j -frame, a triple W = 〈W,,Q〉, where W is a set of
possible worlds,  is an accessibility relation such that 〈W,〉 is an ordinary Kripke frame
for intuitionistic logic, i.e., a partially ordered set, and Q ⊆ W is a cone (upward closed
set) with respect to , which we will call the cone of abnormal worlds. Worlds lying out
of Q are called normal. As usual, a valuation v of a j -frame W is a mapping from the set
of propositional variables to the set of cones of the ordering 〈W,〉. A model µ = 〈W, v〉
is a pair consisting of a j -frame and its valuation. We say also in this case that µ is a model
on W.
The forcing relation between models and formulas is defined in just the same way as
for ordinary Kripke frames. The only exception is the case of constant ⊥. More precisely,
we define the relation µ |=x ϕ, where µ = 〈W, v〉 is a model, W = 〈W,,Q〉, x ∈ W , and
62 S.P. Odintsov / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 43–65ϕ is a formula, by induction on the structure of formulas as follows. For a propositional
variable pi , we put
µ |=x pi ⇔ x ∈ v(pi).
And further,
µ |=x ϕ ∧ψ ⇔ µ |=x ϕ and µ |=x ψ;
µ |=x ϕ ∨ψ ⇔ µ |=x ϕ or µ |=x ψ;
µ |=x ϕ → ψ ⇔ ∀y ∈ W
(
x  y ⇒ (µ |=y ϕ ⇒ µ |=y ψ)
)
.
Finally, for the constant ⊥, we put
µ |=x ⊥ ⇔ x ∈ Q.
In particular, for a negated formula ¬ϕ considered as an abbreviation for ϕ → ⊥, we have
µ |=x ¬ϕ ⇔ ∀y ∈ W
(
x  y ⇒ (µ |=y ϕ ⇒ y ∈ Q)
)
.
We will read µ |=x ϕ as “a formula ϕ is true at a world (or at a point) x in a model µ”.
As usual, we say that a formula ϕ is true on a model µ = 〈W, v〉, µ |= ϕ, if for all x ∈ W
the relation µ |=x ϕ holds. A formula ϕ is true on a j -frame W, W |= ϕ, if it is true on a
model 〈W, v〉 for an arbitrary valuation v of the j -frame W. A formula ϕ is valid on the
class K of Kripke j -frames if W |= ϕ for any j -frame W ∈ K.
Let W = 〈W,,Q〉 be a j -frame and let K ⊆ W be a cone with respect to . We define
a j -frame WK in the following way WK := 〈K,K,QK 〉, where K= ∩(K)2, QK =
Q ∩ K . If µ = 〈W, v〉 is a model on W, then µK = 〈WK,vK 〉, where vK(p) = v(p) ∩ K
for all propositional variables p.
Lemma 32. Let W = 〈W,,Q〉 be an arbitrary j -frame, µ a model on W, and K ⊆ W a
cone. For any x ∈ K and an arbitrary formula ϕ, we have
µ |=x ϕ ⇔ µK |=x ϕ.
In particular,
W |= ϕ ⇒ WK |= ϕ.
We say that a j -frame W is a model for a logic L ∈ Jhn, W |= L, if W |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L.
For a class K of frames, we put
LK := {ϕ | W |= ϕ for any W ∈ K}.
If L = LK for some L ∈ Jhn, we will say that L is characterized by the class K.
We will call a j -frame W = 〈W,,Q〉 normal if Q = ∅, i.e., if all worlds of this frame
are normal. It is clear that normal j -frames can be identified with ordinary Kripke frames
for intuitionistic logic. A j -frame W = 〈W,,Q〉 is abnormal if Q = W , i.e., if all worlds
are abnormal. Finally, a j -frame W = 〈W,,Q〉 will be called identical if the accessibility
relation  coincides with the identity relation on W , = IdW .
The end-point logics of the intervals Int, Neg, and Par can be characterized by the
following classes of j -frames.
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(1) Minimal logic Lj is characterized by the class of all j -frames.
(2) Intuitionistic logic Li is characterized by the class of all normal j -frames.
(3) Minimal negative logic Ln is characterized by the class of all abnormal j -frames.
(4) Logic of classical refutability Le is characterized by the class of all identical j -frames.
(5) Classical logic Lk is characterized by the class of all identical normal j -frames.
(6) Maximal negative logic Lmn is characterized by the class of all identical abnormal
j -frames.
For an arbitrary j -frame W = 〈W,,Q〉 we define the following frames
W(+) := 〈W \Q, ∩ (W \Q)2,∅〉 and W(−) := WQ = 〈Q, ∩Q2,Q〉.
Obviously, the frame W(+) is normal, whereas W(−) is abnormal for an arbitrary j -frame
W. As we can see from the propositions below, the frames defined above are analogues of
upper and lower algebras associated with the given j -algebra.
First of all we mention the following simple fact. For any j -frame W and any formula
ϕ, the translation In(ϕ) is true on the j -frame W(−),
W(−) |= In(ϕ).
This fact can be checked via an easy induction on the structure of formulas.
Lemma 34. Let W be an arbitrary j -frame, v a valuation of W(+), and let v′ be any
valuation of W such that for any propositional variable p we have v(p) = v′(p)∩(W \Q).
Then for any formula ϕ and for an arbitrary element x ∈ W \Q the following equivalence
holds
〈W, v′〉 |=x In(ϕ) ⇔ 〈W(+), v〉 |=x ϕ.
Proof. Let µ′ := 〈W, v′〉 and µ(+) := 〈W(+), v〉.
We argue by induction on the structure of formulas. The case of ⊥ is trivial. For an
arbitrary propositional variable p and x ∈ W \ Q we have µ′ |=x p ∨ ⊥ if and only if
x ∈ v′(p). Thus, we have x ∈ v′(p) and x ∈ W \ Q, i.e., x ∈ v(p). The latter is equivalent
to µ(+) |=x p.
Now, we assume that for formulas ϕ and ψ , and for all x ∈ W \Q the equivalences
µ′ |=x In(ϕ) ⇔ µ(+) |=x ϕ and µ′ |=x In(ψ) ⇔ µ(+) |=x ψ
hold. Prove that the desired equivalence takes place for the implication ϕ → ψ .
Let µ′ |=x In(ϕ → ψ) (= In(ϕ) → In(ψ)) for some x ∈ W \ Q. This means that for
all x  y ∈ W the relation µ′ |=y In(ϕ) implies µ′ |=y In(ψ). In view of the assumed
equivalences, we have
∀y ∈ W \Q(x  y ⇒ (µ(+) |=y ϕ ⇒ µ(+) |=y ψ)),
and so µ(+) |=x ϕ → ψ .
64 S.P. Odintsov / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 43–65Conversely, let µ(+) |=x ϕ → ψ for some x ∈ W \Q. Taking into account our assump-
tion, we have that for all x  y ∈ W \ Q if µ′ |=y In(ϕ), then µ′ |=y In(ψ). If y ∈ Q, then
µ′ |=y In(ϕ) and µ′ |=y In(ψ). Thus, for all x  y ∈ W ,
µ′ |=y In(ϕ) ⇒ µ′ |=y In(ψ),
which means that µ′ |=x In(ϕ → ψ).
The cases of disjunction and conjunction are trivial. 
Proposition 35. For a j -frame W and a formula ϕ, the following equivalences hold
W |= In(ϕ) ⇔ W(+) |= ϕ,
W |= ⊥ → ϕ ⇔ W(−) |= ϕ.
Proof. The first equivalence immediately follows from the previous lemma and the remark
before lemma.
If W |= ⊥ → ϕ, then for any valuation v of W, the formula ϕ is true in all abnormal
worlds of the model 〈W, v〉, which means by Lemma 32 that 〈W(−), vQ〉 |= ϕ. Any valua-
tion v of W(−) can be considered as a valuation of W, in which case v = vQ. Thus, for all
valuations v of W(−), we have 〈W(−), v〉 |= ϕ, i.e., W(−) |= ϕ.
Conversely, the assumption W(−) |= ϕ implies that for any valuation v of W, 〈W(−),
vQ〉 |= ϕ. In view of Lemma 32, the latter means that for all valuations v of W, the formula
ϕ will be true at any abnormal world of a model 〈W, v〉, which implies, in turn, 〈W, v〉 |=
⊥ → ϕ. 
The following statement easily follows from Propositions 10 and 35.
Corollary 36. Let L ∈ Jhn and W |= L. Then
W(+) |= Lint and W(−) |= Lneg.
For a class of j -frames K we define
K(+) := {W(+) | W ∈ K}, K(−) := {W(−) | W ∈ K}.
Proposition 37. Let K be a class of j -frames and let L = LK. Then Lint = LK(+) and
Lneg = LK(−).
Proof. The inclusion Lint ⊆ LK(+) follows from Corollary 36. We argue for the inverse
inclusion. Take a ϕ /∈ Lint, in which case In(ϕ) /∈ L. Consequently, there exist a frame W ∈
K, its valuation v, and an element x ∈ W such that 〈W, v〉 |=x In(ϕ). As was noticed above,
any formula of the form In(ψ) is true in any model at any abnormal element, therefore,
x /∈ Q. Whence, by Lemma 34, we have W(+) |= ϕ.
Now we turn to the second equality. Again, we have to prove only the inclusion Lneg ⊆
LK(−) since the inverse inclusion follows from Corollary 36. Let ϕ does not belong to Lneg,
i.e., L ⊥ → ϕ. Consider a j -frame W ∈ K such that W |= ⊥ → ϕ. From the last relation
we obtain by Proposition 35 that W(−) |= ϕ, i.e., ϕ /∈ LK(−). 
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